We address the problem of maximizing privacy of stochastic dynamical systems whose state information is released through quantized sensor data. In particular, we consider the setting where information about the system state is obtained using noisy sensor measurements. This data is quantized and transmitted to a remote station through a public/unsecured communication network. We aim at keeping the state of the system private; however, because the network is not secure, adversaries might have access to sensor data, which can be used to estimate the system state. To prevent such adversaries from obtaining an accurate state estimate, before transmission, we randomize quantized sensor data using additive random vectors, and send the corrupted data to the remote station instead. We design the joint probability distribution of these additive vectors (over a time window) to minimize the mutual information (our privacy metric) between some linear function of the system state (a desired private output) and the randomized sensor data for a desired level of distortion-how different quantized sensor measurements and distorted data are allowed to be. We pose the problem of synthesising the joint probability distribution of the additive vectors as a convex program subject to linear constraints. Simulation experiments are presented to illustrate our privacy scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a hyperconnected world, scientific and technological advances have led to an overwhelming amount of user data being collected and processed by hundreds of companies over public networks. Companies mine this data to provide personalized services. However, these new technologies have also led to an alarming widespread loss of privacy in society and vulnerabilities within critical infrastructure -e.g., power, water, transportation. Depending on adversaries resources, opponents may infer critical (private) information about the operation of systems from public data available on the internet and unsecured/public servers and communication networks. A motivating example of this privacy loss is the potential use of data from smart electrical meters by criminals, advertising agencies, and governments, for monitoring the presence and activities of occupants [1] , [2] . Other examples are privacy loss Carlos caused by information sharing in distributed control systems and cloud computing [3] ; the use of travel data for traffic estimation in intelligent transportation systems [4] ; and data collection and sharing by the Internet-of-Things (IoT) [5] , which is, most of the time, done without the users informed consent. These privacy concerns show that there is an acute need for privacy preserving mechanisms capable of handling the new privacy challenges induced by an interconnected world, which, in turn, has attracted the attention of researchers from different fields (e.g., computer science, information theory, and control theory) in the broad area of privacy and security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) -engineered systems that integrate computation, networking, and dynamic physical components -see, e.g., [6] - [23] .
In most engineering applications, information about the state of systems, say X, is obtained through sensor measurements. Once this information is collected, it is usually quantized, encoded, and sent to a remote station for signal processing and decision-making purposes through communication networks. Examples of such systems are numerous: water and electricity consumption meters, traffic monitoring systems, industrial control systems, and so on. If the communication network is public or unsecured, adversaries might access and estimate the state of the system. To avoid an accurate state estimation, before transmission, we randomize quantized sensor data using additive random vectors and send the corrupted data to the remote station instead. These vectors are designed to hide (as much as possible) the private part of the state S -a desired private output modeled as some linear function of the system state, S = DX, for some deterministic matrix D. Note, however, that it is not desired to overly distort the original sensor data. We might change the data excessively for practical purposes. Hence, when selecting the additive distorting vectors, we need to take into account the trade-off between privacy and distortion. As distortion metric, we use the mean squared error between the original sensor data, Y , and its randomized version, Z = G(Y ), for some probabilistic mapping G(·). In this manuscript, we follow an informationtheoretic approach to privacy. As privacy metric, we propose the mutual information [24] , I[S; Z], between a quantized versionS of the private output S and the disclosed randomized sensor data Z = G(Y ) (over a finite time window). Mutual information I[V ; W ] between two jointly distributed vectors, V and W , is a measure of the statistical dependence between V and W [24] . We design the joint probability distribution of the distorting additive vectors to minimize I[S; Z] (over a time window), for a desired level of distortion -how different quantized sensor measurements and distorted data are allowed to be. We pose the problem of synthesising the joint probability distribution of these additive vectors as a convex program subject to linear constraints.
Using additive random vectors to increase privacy is common practice. In the context of privacy of databases, a popular approach is differential privacy [19] , [25] , where random noise is added to the response of queries so that private information stored in the database cannot be inferred. In differential privacy, because it provides certain privacy guarantees, Laplace noise is usually used [26] . However, when maximal privacy with minimal distortion is desired, Laplace noise is generally not the optimal solution. This raises the fundamental question: for a given allowable distortion level, what is the noise distribution achieving maximal privacy? This question has many possible answers depending on the particular privacy and distortion metrics being considered and the system configuration [27] - [30] . There are also results addressing this question from an information theoretic perspective, where information metrics -e.g., mutual information, entropy, Kullback-Leibler divergence, and Fisher information -are used to quantify privacy [1] , [2] , [6] , [8] , [10] , [18] , [31] , [32] .
In general, if the data to be kept private follows continuous probability distributions, the problem of finding the optimal additive noise to maximize privacy (even without considering distortion) is hard to solve. If a close-form solution for the distribution is desired, the problem amounts to solving a set of nonlinear partial differential equations which, in general, might not have a solution, and even if they do have a solution, it is hard to find [6] . This problem has been addressed by imposing some particular structure on the considered distributions or assuming the data to be kept private is deterministic [6] , [28] , [29] .
The authors in [28] , [29] consider deterministic input data sets and treat optimal distributions as distributions that concentrate probability around zero as much as possible while ensuring differential privacy. Under this framework, they obtain a family of piecewise constant density functions that achieve minimal distortion for a given level of privacy. In [6] , the authors consider the problem of preserving the privacy of deterministic databases using constrained additive noise. They use the Fisher information and the Cramer-Rao bound to construct a privacy metric between noise-free data and the one with the additive noise and find the probability density function that minimizes it. Moreover, they prove that, in the unconstrained case, the optimal noise distribution minimizing the Fisher information is Gaussian. This observation has also been made in [33] when using mutual information as a measure of privacy.
Most of the aforementioned papers propose optimal continuous distributions assuming deterministic data. However, in a Cyber-Physical-Systems context, the inherent system dynamics and unavoidable system and sensor noise lead to stochastic non-stationary data and thus existing tools do not fit this setting. Here, we identify two possibilities for addressing our problem: 1) we might inject continuous noise to sensor measurements, then quantize the sum, and send it over the unsecured/public network; or 2), the one considered here, quantize sensor measurements, randomize quantized sensor data using additive random vectors with discrete distributions, and send the randomized data over the network. As motivated above, to address the first option, even assuming deterministic sensor data, we have to impose some particular structure on the distributions of the additive noise; and, if sensor data is stochastic, the problem becomes hard to solve (sometimes even untractable). As we prove in this manuscript, if we select the second alternative, under some mild assumptions on the system dynamics and the additive distorting vectors, we can cast the problem of finding the optimal additive vectors as a constrained convex optimization. To the best of the authors knowledge, this problem has not been considered before as it is posed it here.
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES A. Notation
The Euclidian norm in R n is denoted by ||X||, ||X|| 2 = X ⊤ X, where ⊤ denotes transposition. The n × n identity matrix is denoted by I n or simply I if n is clear from the context. Similarly, n × m matrices composed of only ones and only zeros are denoted by 1 n×m and 0 n×m , respectively, or simply 1 and 0 when their dimensions are clear. For positive definite (semidefinite) matrices, we use the notation P > 0 (P ≥ 0); moreover, P > Q (P ≥ Q) means that the matrix P − Q is positive definite (semidefinite). For any two matrices A and B, the notation A ⊗ B (the Kronecker product [34] ) stands for the matrix composed of submatrices A ij B , where A ij , i, j = 1, ..., n, stands for the ijth entry of the n × n matrix A. Consider a discrete random vector X with alphabet X = {x 1 , . . . , x N }, x i ∈ R m , m, N ∈ N, i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, and probability mass function (pmf) p(x) = Pr[X = x], x ∈ X , where Pr[B] denotes probability of event B. We denote its probability mass function by p(x) rather than p X (x) to simplify notation. Thus, p(x) and p(y) refer to two different random vectors, and are, in fact, different probability mass functions, p X (x) and p Y (y), respectively. For a discrete stochastic process X(k) taking values from the alphabet X k ⊂ R m , we denote its probability mass function as p k (x(k)) = Pr[X(k) = x(k)], x(k) ∈ X k . For simplicity of notation, if the alphabet of X(k) is timeinvariant and finite, i.e., X k = X := {x 1 , . . . , x N }, x i ∈ R m , for some finite m, N ∈ N, we write its pmf at time k as p k (x) = Pr[X(k) = x], x ∈ X . We denote by "Simplex" the probability simplex defined by x∈X p(x) = 1, p(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X . The notation X ∼ N [µ, Σ X ] means that X ∈ R n is a normally distributed random vector with mean E[X] = µ ∈ R n and covariance matrix E[(X−µ)(X−µ) T ] = Σ X ∈ R n×n , where E[a] denotes the expected value of the random vector a. We denote independence between two random vectors, X and Y , as X |= Y . Finite sequences of vectors are written as X K := (X(1) ⊤ , . . . , X(K) ⊤ ) ⊤ ∈ R Kn and X K2 K1 := (X(K 1 ) ⊤ , . . . , X(K 2 ) ⊤ ) ⊤ ∈ R (K2−K1)n with K 2 > K 1 , X(i) ∈ R n , and n, K, K 1 , K 2 ∈ N. To avoid confusion, we denote powers of matrices as (A) K = A · · · A (K times) for K > 0, (A) 0 = I, and (A) K = 0 for K < 0. Given two numbers a and b, b > 0, the notation a mod b stands for a modulo b, and for a vector a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ⊤ , a i ∈ R >0 , i = 1, . . . , n, a mod b = (a 1 mod b, . . . , a n mod b) ⊤ . . The mutual information I[X; Y ] between two jointly distributed vectors, X and Y , is a measure of the statistical dependence between X and Y .
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Description, Quantization, and Stochastic Mappings
We study discrete-time stochastic systems of the form:
with time-instants k ∈ N, state X ∈ R nx , n x ∈ N, output Y ∈ R ny , n y ∈ N, performance (private) output S ∈ R ns , n s ∈ N, stochastic disturbances M ∈ R nx and W ∈ R ny , reference signal U ∈ R nu , n u ∈ N, and matrices A ∈ R nx×nx , B ∈ R nx×nu , C ∈ R ny×nx , and D ∈ R ns×nx . Matrix D is full row rank. The perturbations M (k) and W (k) are i.i.d. multivariate Gaussian processes with E[M (k)] = 0, E[W (k)] = 0, and covariance matrices
The initial state X(1) is assumed to be a Gaussian random vector with E[X(1)] = µ X 1 ∈ R nx and covariance matrix
The processes M (k), k ∈ N and W (k), k ∈ N, and the initial condition X(1) are mutually independent. It is assumed that the matrices (vectors) (A, B, C, D, Σ X 1 , µ X 1 , Σ M , Σ W ) are known, and the reference signal U (k) is known and deterministic.
Sensor measurements Y (k) ∈ R ny are quantized using a vector regular quantizer [35] 
with quantization levels y j ∈ R ny , j = 1, 2, . . . , N Y , quantization cells c j ⊂ R ny , j c j = R ny , j c j = ∅, set of quantization cells C := {c 1 , . . . , c NY }, and set of quantization
is parametrized by the quantization levels y j ∈ R ny , the quantization cells c j ⊂ R ny , j = 1, . . . , N Y , and the number of cells N Y ∈ N. Note that, if we know the multivariate probability density f k (y(k)) of Y (k) and the quantizer, we can always obtain the probability mass function p k (ỹ(k)) of Y (k) by integrating f k (y(k)) over the quantization cells c j , j = 1, . . . , N Y . Moreover, the alphabet of the discrete multivariate random processỸ (k) is given by the set of quantization Figure 2 . The vector Z(k) is transmitted over an unsecured communication network to a remote station, see Figure 1 . Note that, even by passing Y (k) through G(k, ·) before transmission, information about the private output S(k) is directly accessible through Z(k) at the unsecured network. Here, we aim at finding the mapping G(k, ·) (the transition probabilities p k (z|ỹ)) that minimizes this information leakage. Note, however, that we do not want to makeỸ (k) and Z(k) overly different either. By passing Y (k) through G(k, ·), we might distortỸ (k) excessively for practical purposes. Hence, when designing the distribution p k (z|ỹ), we need to consider the trade-off between privacy and distortion.
B. Metrics and Problem Formulation
For given time horizon K ∈ N, the aim of our privacy scheme is to make inference of the sequence of private vectors
As distortion metric, we use the stacked mean squared error:
; and, as privacy metrics, the mutual information I[S K ; Z K ], whereS K = (S(1) ⊤ , . . . ,S(K) ⊤ ) ⊤ andS(i) ∈ R ns denotes a quantized version of the private output S(i), i = 1, . . . , K. A natural question arises here: Why don't we directly use I[S K ; Z K ] as privacy metric? Note that, because X(1), M (k), and W (k) are Gaussian, S K is jointly normally distributed. Moreover, Z K is a discrete random vector which conditional distribution depends on the quantizer, Q Y (Y (k), N Y , C, Y), and the density of Y (k). Hence, I[S K ; Z K ] would denote the mutual information between continuous and discrete random vectors. This type of mutual information is not always well defined. There are some hybrid definitions available in the literature that have been used to estimate mutual information between continuous and discrete data sets [36] - [40] . However, we prefer to avoid using hybrid formulations, because they lead to complicated expressions which are hard to evaluate, and work directly with the definition of mutual information introduced by Shannon for discrete random vectors (given in Definition 1) by discretizing the density of S(k) to compute I[S K ; Z K ].
Summarizing the above discussion, we aim at minimizing
and elements of Y K belong to R Kny , i.e., sinceỸ (k) and Z(k) have alphabet Y, k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, the stacked vectors Y K and Z K have alphabet Y K .
Remark 1
The number of optimization variables p(z K |ỹ K ) depends on the number of quantization levels N Y and the horizon K. Both stacked vectors Y K and Z K take values from the alphabet Y K = Y × . . . × Y (K times) and because Y is the set of N Y quantization levels, Y K has (N Y ) K elements. We aim at computing an optimal transition probability p(z K |ỹ K ) from each element of the alphabet of Y K to every element of the alphabet of Z K . Therefore, we have
. This is already a large-scale optimization problem for quantizers with moderate resolution and fairly small K. For instance, a 3-bit quantizer (N Y = 8) and a horizon of K = 5 requires more than a billion variables. A possible solution to this dimensionality problem is to impose some structure on p(z K |ỹ K ) to reduce the number of variables. That is, we could set some of the transition probabilities to a constant known value a priori, and use the remaining ones to minimize the mutual information. In what follows, we propose a systematic way to achieve this using an additive random process. We impose structure to the probabilistic mapping G(k, :) (see Figure 1 ) so that the number of variables in
The proposed probabilistic mapping G(k, ·) consists of the following three objects: 1) a coding function α :
in what follows, we use q k (v) as optimization variables and we want to clearly distinguish q k (v) from other probability mass functions); and 3) a decoding function β :
We characterize each of these objects before introducing the mapping G(k, ·). The indexing (coding) function α : Y →Ȳ is defined as
For givenỸ (k) ∈ Y and corresponding α(Ỹ (k)) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N Y − 1}, we add a realization of the process
has the same alphabet asỸ (k). Then, we decode the sum using the function
Note that β(α(ζ)) = ζ and α(β(ξ)) = ξ. We construct the (3) and (4) as follows
In Figure 3 , we depict a schematic diagram of the mapping G(k, ·). Since α(·) and β(·) are fixed injective functions, we can only use the probability mass function
In what follows, we formally present the optimization problems we seek to address.
Problem 1 Given the system dynamics (1), sensor quantizer
. . , K}, and the probabilistic mapping (3)-(5), find the probability mass function q(v K ) solution of the following optimization problem:
IV. SOLUTION TO PROBLEM 1
Consider the cost function I[S K ; Z K ] for some quantized versionS K of the stacked private output S K , and the system dynamics (1) . At time k, S(k) can be written in terms of the initial condition, the stacked reference U k−1 , and the stacked disturbance
is the sum of independent Gaussian random vectors (and thus it is also Gaussian). It follows that the support of S(k) is the whole R ns . To discretize the density of S(k), we divide its support into a finite set of cells. Let H :
Associated with each cell h j , we introduce the corresponding quantization level s j ∈ h j ⊂ R ns , i.e., s j denotes a n s -dimensional point in the interior of h j , j ∈ {1, . . . , N S }. We collect all the quantization levels into the set S := {s 1 , . . . , s NS }. Then, the quantized private output, S(k) ∈ R ns , can be written as
Denote the stacked vector of quantized private outputs as S K = (S(1) ⊤ , . . . ,S(K) ⊤ ) ⊤ ∈ R Kns . Note that if we know the joint probability density function of S K , once we have fixed the quantizer Q S (·), we can obtain the probability mass function p(s K ) = Pr[S K =s K ],s K ∈ S K := S × . . . × S (K times) by integrating the density of S K over the cells in H. For the discrete random vectorS K , we have a well defined mutual information I[S K ; Z K ]. By Definition 1, the cost I[S K ; Z K ] is a function of p(s K , z K ), and the marginals p(s K ) and p(z K ). However, to minimize I[S K ; Z K ], we need to write it in terms of q(v K ) (our design variables). Notice that, if the joint density of S Y and Y K is a non-degenerate Gaussian, we can numerically compute p(s K |ỹ K ) for anys K ∈ S K andỹ K ∈ Y K ; and that, because (by construction)S(k) and Z(k) are conditionally independent givenỸ (k),S K and Z K are conditionally independent givenỸ K . The latter implies that
. Then, for given p(ỹ K ) and p(s K |ỹ K ), we can write the cost I[S K ; Z K ] in terms of p(z K |ỹ K ) and q(v K ). In the following lemma, we write the cost function I[Ỹ K ; Z K ] in terms of q(v K ), and prove that it is convex in q(v K ). Before stating the lemma, we need some extra notation.
. . , K}, define the stacked indexing function α : Y K →Ȳ K , withȲ K :=Ȳ × · · · ×Ȳ (K times) and Y = {0, . . . , N Y − 1}, as:
where α(·) is the indexing function defined in (3).
is a convex function of q(v K ) for given p(s K |ỹ K ) and p(ỹ K ), and is written as:
whereᾱ : Y K →Ȳ K denotes the stacked indexing function defined in (8) .
Proof : The expression on the right-hand side of (9a) follows by inspection of Definition 1, and the fact that p(s K , z K ) = p(s K )p(z K |s K ) (chain rule). By [24, Theorem 2.7.4], cost (9a) is convex in p(z K |s K ) for given p(s K ). However, our optimization variables are q(v K ) and not p(z K |s K ). By construction,S K and Z K are conditionally independent givenỸ K [41] ; therefore, p(s K ,ỹ K , z K ) = p(s K )p(ỹ K |s K )p(z K |ỹ K ). Using this expression for p(s K ,ỹ K , z K ), we can write (9b) and (9c) by conditioning and marginalizing the joint distribution. It follows that, by combining (9a)-(9c), we can write I[S K ; Z K ] in terms of p(z K |ỹ K ), p(ỹ K |s K ), and p(s K ), i.e., the cost is a function of p(z K |ỹ K ) and it is parametrized by p(ỹ K |s K ) and p(s K ). Convexity with respect to p(z K |ỹ K ) follows from convexity with respect to p(z K |s K ) because p(z K |s K ) is just a linear combination of p(z K |ỹ K ), see (9b), and convexity is preserved under affine transformations [42] .
for z(i),ỹ(j) ∈ Y, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Using (5), we can further expand Pr[Z K = z K ,Ỹ K =ỹ K ] as follows
where (a) follows from independence between V K andỸ K , (b) from the definition ofᾱ(·) in (8), and (c) by con-
mod N Y and thus (9d) holds true. It remains to prove that I[S K ; Z K ] is convex in q(v K ) for given p(ỹ K ) and p(s K |ỹ K ). We have concluded convexity of I[S K ; Z K ] with respect to p(z K |ỹ K ) above. Hence, because p(
By Lemma 1, I[S K ; Z K ] is convex in our decision variables q(v K ), for given p(s K ) and p(ỹ K |s K ). Then, if the distortion constraint, E[||Z K −Ỹ K || 2 ] ≤ ǫ K , is convex in q(v K ), and we know p(s K ) and p(ỹ K |s K ), we could minimize I[S K ; Z K ] efficiently using off-the-shelf optimization algorithms.
is a linear function of q(v K ) for given p(ỹ K ), and can be written as follows:
(10b)
Proof : Define the function d(Z K ,Ỹ K ) := ||Z K −Ỹ K || 2 . The function d(Z K ,Ỹ K ) is a deterministic function of two jointly distributed random vectors, Z K andỸ K , with joint distribution p(z K ,ỹ K ). The joint distribution can be written as p(z K ,ỹ K ) = p(z K |ỹ K )p(ỹ K ) (chain rule), and, by (9d), the conditional probability distribution is given by p(z K |ỹ K ) = q (ᾱ(z K ) −ᾱ(ỹ K )) mod N Y (see the proof of Lemma 1 for details). That is, p(z K |ỹ K ) is a linear transformation of q(v K ). Therefore, see, e.g., [41] for details,
, and because the joint distribution can be written as
is given by (10) , and it is linear in q(v K ) for given p(ỹ K ).
By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the cost, I[S K ; Z K ], and constraint, E[||Z K −Ỹ K || 2 ] ≤ ǫ K , are parametrized by p(s K ) and p(ỹ K |s K ). To obtain these distributions, we need to integrate the density of S K and the joint density of (S K , Y K ) (if they are not degenerate) over the quantization cells. By lifting the system dynamics (1) over {1, . . . , K}, we can write the stacked vector ((Y K ) ⊤ , (S K ) ⊤ ) ⊤ ∈ R K(ns+ny) as
Lemma 3
(13) Proof : To simplify notation, we introduce the stacked vector Θ K := ((Y K ) ⊤ , (S K ) ⊤ ) ⊤ . By assumption, the initial condition X(1), and the processes, M (k) and W (k), k ∈ N, are mutually independent, and X (1) 
for some positive definite covariance matrices Σ X 1 , Σ M , and Σ W . Then, see [41] for details, we have
, for any deterministic matrices L j , j = 1, 2, 3, of appropriate dimensions. It follows that Θ K = ((Y K ) ⊤ , (S K ) ⊤ ) ⊤ given in (11) is the sum of a deterministic vector, [C ⊤ KD ⊤ K ] ⊤ L K U K−1 , and three independent normally distributed vectors. Therefore, Θ K follows a multivariate normal distribution with
By inspection, using the expression of Θ K in (11), mutual independence among X(1), M (k), and W (k), k ∈ N, and the definition of (13) . It remains to prove that the distribution of Θ K is not degenerate, i.e., Σ Y,S K > 0. Note that Σ Y,S K in (13) can be written as
A necessary condition for the block matrix Σ Y,S K in (15) to be positive definite is that the diagonal blocks are positive definite [43] . The left-upper block is positive definite because Σ W > 0 (which implies (I K ⊗ Σ W ) > 0 [43] ). The right-lower block is positive definite ifD K is full row rank and Q is positive definite. Because D is full row rank by assumption, matrix D K := (I K ⊗ D) is also full row rank [44, Theorem 4.2.15] . Note that Q can be factored as follows
That is, Q is a linear transformation of the block diagonal matrix Q ′ above. By inspection, it can be verified that matrix P = [F K T K ], see (12) , is lower triangular with identity matrices on the diagonal; thus, P is invertible. It follows that Q = P Q ′ P ⊤ is a congruence transformation of Q ′ [45] . The later implies that Q and Q ′ have the same signature [45] (equal number of positive and nonpositive eigenvalues); hence, Q is positive definite if and only if the block diagonal matrices of Q ′ are positive definite. Matrices Σ X 1 and Σ M are positive definite by assumption (which implies (I K−1 ⊗ Σ M ) > 0), and thus we can conclude that Q > 0, which implies D K QD ⊤ K > 0 becauseD K is full row rank. Necessary and sufficient conditions for Σ Y,S K > 0 areD K QD ⊤ K > 0 (which we have already proved) and that the Schur complement Theorem 1.12] . This Schur complement is given by
Regarding Q ′′ as the Schur complement of a higher dimensional matrix Q ′′′ , we can conclude that:
which is trivially true because Q −1 is positive definite since Q > 0. Hence,D K QD ⊤ K and Σ Y,S K /D K QD ⊤ K are both positive definite, and thus Σ Y,S K > 0. To obtain the density of S K , we just marginalize the joint density N [ 41] . We give the density of S K in the following corollary of Lemma 3. (1), . . . ,Ỹ (K) =ỹ(K)|S(1) = s(1), . . . ,S(K) =s(K)]. Moreover, by construction of the quantizers, we have:
, for any set of quantization levels {y l , . . . , y i }, l, . . . , i ∈ {1, . . . , N Y } and {h r , . . . , h j }, r, . . . , j ∈ {1, . . . , N S }.
Therefore, by integrating the joint density N [
⊤ over the quantization cells, we can compute the probability mass functions p(ỹ K |s K ) and p(s K ).
In what follows, we pose the nonlinear program for solving Problem 2.
Theorem 1 Given the system dynamics (1), sensor quantizer (2), private output quantizer (7) , probabilistic mapping (3)-(5), time horizon K ∈ N, desired distortion level ǫ K ∈ R ≥0 , joint probability density N [ Lemma 6) , and corresponding probability mass functions p(ỹ K |s K ) and p(s K ), the probability mass function p(v K ) that minimizes I[S K ; Z K ] subject to the distortion constraint, E[||Z K −Ỹ K || 2 ] ≤ ǫ K , can be found by solving the convex program in (14) . Proof: The expression for the cost and its convexity follow from Lemma 1. The distortion constraint follows from Lemma 2, and the fact that, becauseS K and Z K are conditionally independent givenỸ K , the joint distribution p(z K ,ỹ K ) can be written as s K ∈S K p(s K )p(ỹ K |s K )p(z K |ỹ K ).
Once we have the optimal joint distribution q * (v K ) solution to (14) , we sample from this distribution to obtain an optimal sequence of realizations V K = (v * (1), . . . , v * (K)) ⊤ that we induce to system (1) at every time-step, see Figure 1 and Figure 3 . We remark that these realizations are computed a priori, i.e., before we start running the system. Real-time realizations of Y (K) are not needed to compute the optimal distorting distribution. We only require the probability distributions of the processes driving the system dynamics to cast (14) and compute q * (v K ).
Remark 3 Note that, even though working with N K variables is much more manageable than working with the original N 2K variables (see Remark 1) , having N K variables is still a large scale optimization problem. Note, however, that (14) is solved off-line, i.e., because real-time sensor realizations are not required to perform the optimization-only the distributions of the processes driving the system are needed-the optimal mappings can be computed before we start running the system. Moreover, problem (14) is convex and real-valued. It has a smooth cost function, bounded variables, and linear constraints. There exists many algorithms in the literature to solve this class of large-scale problems efficiently and reasonably fast, see, for instance, [42] , [47] , [48] .
A. Receding Horizon
For the configuration given in Theorem 1, we have addressed the problem of designing optimal probabilistic mappings to maximize privacy for a finite time horizon K. Infinite horizon sub-optimal mappings can be designed by repeatedly solving finite time problems of the form (14) in a receding horizon fashion. With receding horizon we mean the following: for each time step, starting at the current time k, we solve a finite horizon problem of the form (14) over a fixed horizon K, i.e., over the time window {k, k+1, . . . , k+K−1}. We sample from the obtained optimal probability distribution q * (v k+K−1 k ) to obtain an optimal sequence of realizations
We only apply the first realization, V (k) = v * k (1), to the system and discard the rest. Then, for the next time step, k + 1, we solve a new finite horizon problem over {k + 1, k + 2, . . . , k + K}, obtain a new optimal distribution, sample from it, and again only apply the first optimal realization, V (k + 1) = v * k+1 (1), and discard the rest. We continue shifting the prediction horizon forward to compute the sequence of receding horizon optimal probability distributions and realizations.
Note that, besides the desired distortion constant ǫ K , problem (14) only requires the probability mass functions p(ỹ K |s K ) and p(s K ) ofỸ K |S K andS K , respectively, as input information. Similarly, in a receding horizon formulation, for given horizon length K, we only need ǫ K , and the probability distributions p(ỹ 
, with L K = T K (I K−1 ⊗ B),C K = I K ⊗ C,D K = I K ⊗ D, and F K and T K as defined in (12) . 
with Σ S k,K := . This optimal distribution is the output of our receding scheme at time k. Once the optimal distributions have been computed, we sample from q * v k+K−1 k to obtain an optimal sequence of realizations V k+K−1 k = (v * k (1), . . . , v * k (K)) ⊤ , and only apply the first realization, V (k) = v * k (1), to the system at time k, and discard the rest. Then, at time k + 1, we sample from q * v k+K k+1 and only apply the first realization, V (k + 1) = v * k+1 (1), and discard the rest. We repeat the procedure for increasing k.
V. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
We illustrate the performance of our tools through a case study of a well stirred chemical reactor with heat exchanger. This case study has been developed over the years as a benchmark example for control systems and fault detection, see, e.g., [49] - [51] and references therein. The state, inputs, and output of the reactor are:
: Concentration of the chemical product, T0
: Temperature of the product, Tw
: Temperature of the jacket water of heat exchanger, Tm
: Coolant temperature, Cu
: Inlet concentration of reactant, Tu
: Inlet temperature, Tw,u : Coolant water inlet temperature.
We use the discretized dynamics of the reactor introduced in [51] . The discrete-time dynamics is of the form (1) with matrices A, B, C as follows 
The original model in [49] does not consider sensor/system noise and reference signals, we include some arbitrary noise and references for our simulation experiments. We consider system and sensor noise with covariance matrices Σ M = diag[0. (1) is given by the full row rank matrix D = (1, 0, 0, 0). The output of the system is the temperature of the product T 0 , which could be monitored, e.g., for quality/safety reasons. Then, the aim of the privacy scheme is to hide the concentration of the reactant as much as possible without distorting temperature measurements excessively. We first consider the receding horizon formulation of Problem For the private output S(k), we use a binary quantizer (N S = 2) with levels S = {s 1 , s 2 } = {6.20, 7.68}, and cells H = {h 1 , h 2 } = {(−∞, 6.94], (6.94, ∞)}. These quantizers were selected based on system trajectories to avoid having always saturatedỸ (k) andS(k), see Figure 4 . Then, for horizon K = 3 and k ∈ N, the stacked quantized outputỸ k+K−1 k (and thus also Z k+K−1 k ) and the stacked private outputS k+K−1 k have alphabets Y 3 (with (N Y ) K = 512 elements) and S 3 (with (N S ) K = 8 elements) given by
with y i , i = 1, 2, . . . , 8, and s j , j ∈ {1, 2}, as introduced above. We let the distorting random process V (k) (see (3) Figure 5(a) , we show the joint probability mass function p(ỹ 3 1 ,s 3 1 ),ỹ 3 1 ,s 3 1 ∈ Y 3 × S 3 . The mass points are indexed following the ordering logic in (23) . Figure 5 (b) depicts the joint pmf p(ỹ k+2 k ,s k+2 k ), k = 1, . . . , 25, for the first 256 mass points of the alphabet Y 3 × S 3 (indexed as in (23)); and, in Figure 5 (c), we show zooms of the probabilities of the first six mass points for increasing k. Note that there is a lot of variability in the probabilities of the mass points as k increases.
Next, for given p(ỹ k+2 k ,s k+2 k ), we show results of the receding horizon scheme (18) for horizon K = 3, k = 1, 2, . . . , 25, and three different levels of distortion, ǫ K = ∞, 7, 3, where ǫ K = ∞ means that the optimization problems in (18) are solved without considering the distortion constraint. In Figure 6 , we show the optimal distorting distribution q * (v 2 1 ) for ǫ K = ∞ and, in Figure 7 , the evolution (of the first sixteen mass points) of the optimal distribution q * (v k+2 k ) solution to (18) for increasing k and ǫ K = ∞, 7, 2. The mass points are indexed following the ordering logic in (23) . Note that there is a lot of probability variability both among mass points and in time (as k grows). The optimal distorting distributions follow some nontrivial patterns that depend on the dynamics, quantizer, and desired distortion level. Further note that even the unconstraint formulation (ǫ K = ∞) does not lead to uniform distributions; and, as ǫ K → 0, the sequence of optimal distributions q * (v k+2 k ) concentrates most of its probability at the first mass point (the zero vector). This is what one would expect as the zero vector leads to no distortion. For ǫ K = ∞, 7, 2, Figure 8 Figure  8 (b) characterizes the disclosed information if no privacy preserving mapping was in place. Finally, in Figure 9 , we show the joint probability distributions p(z 3 1 ,s 3 1 ) and p(ỹ 3 1 ,s 3 1 ) for ǫ K = ∞ and ǫ K = 2. Note that, as one would expect, p(z 3 1 ,s 3 1 ) → p(ỹ 3 1 ,s 3 1 ) as ǫ K → 0. That is, as we allow for less distortion, we have less freedom to reshape p(ỹ 3 1 ,s 3 1 ) by passingỸ 3 1 through p(ỹ 3 1 ,z 3 1 ) before transmission. We remark that all the above computations were made on a PC, Intel 2.70 GHz, in Matlab 2015b.
VI. CONCLUSION
For a class of Cyber-Physical-Systems (CPSs), we have presented a detailed mathematical framework built around systems theory, information theory, and convex optimization to deal with privacy problems raised by the use of public/unsecured communication networks to transmit sensor data. In particular, to prevent adversaries from obtaining an accurate estimate of the private part of the system state, we have provided tools (in terms of convex programs) to optimally randomize (via some probabilistic mappings) sensor data before transmission for a desired level of distortion. That is, given a maximum level of distortion tolerated by a particular application, we give tools to synthesize probabilistic mappings that maximize privacy (in the sense of hiding the private output as much as possible) while satisfying the distortion constraint on the original sensor data. Our tools are capable of dealing with the dynamic and non-stationary nature of CPSs at the price of having to solve some medium to large scale optimization problems. We have presented extensive simulation experiments to show the performance of out tools. Note that we have found some nontrivial distorting probability distributions that highly depend on the system dynamics, quantizer, and desired distortion level.
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